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1 Introduction
In recent years there has been a lot of discussion of
evaluation methodologies1 and increasingly also of
complexity in development.2 These discussions
seem to be driven by an implicit or explicit
acknowledgement of a need to develop and adjust
the applied methods to new contexts and policy
agendas. In particular, complex and adaptable
programmes are becoming more prominent, but
diversification is widespread and some donors
seem even partly to have returned to an increased
use of project assistance. New financing
instruments and the fact that new actors engage in
evaluation processes contribute to the challenges.
These discussions and their implications for
development evaluation will probably continue and
become even more pronounced with the upcoming
post 2015-agenda, where more comprehensive
global goals are foreseen as well as increasing
integration of development policies with other
policy areas (United Nations 2013).
While debates on methodology, on problems with
development evaluation quality,3 and on how
donors organise their evaluation units have been
intensive, there has been less discussion of the
evaluation process itself4 and the use of evaluation
consultants in particular.5 Development
evaluations can be performed in different ways.
Some donors transfer the full responsibility for
the evaluations to external consultants, others
have internal team leaders assisted by external
consultants, and a few donors have internal
evaluation units, which have full responsibility for
carrying out the evaluations. In spite of this
variation, a feature of many development
evaluations is a significant use of external
evaluation consultants, who are contracted on
short-term contracts based on Terms of Reference
(TOR) elaborated by the donor evaluation units.
This ‘system’, which was established at a time
when project assistance was the most common
approach, has been used for many years without
much discussion and adjustment, and the
general tendency is that the same system and
process is applied by the individual donors
irrespectively of the character of the evaluation.
The reason for this absent discussion is probably
that the independence and use of external
consultants by many are seen as being related,
and that there is a fear of discussing the role of
consultants and the evaluation processes as that
may question the independence and credibility of
development evaluations.
This article provides some thoughts on the
evaluation process and argues that there is an
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urgent need to consider how the organisation of
development evaluation can be adapted to the
challenges of development evaluation. After this
introduction, the article continues with a brief
presentation of the ‘market’ for development
evaluation followed by a discussion of different
perspectives, which can be applied to the
organisation of evaluation processes. It is shown
that each of the presented perspectives can lead
to specific recommendations on how to organise
the evaluations, but also that there is a need for
experimentation and further analyses.
2 The ‘market’ for development evaluation
In 2013 OECD-DAC members provided
US$135 billion in development assistance.6
According to OECD-DAC, these donors produce
more than 600 evaluations, including
decentralised evaluations, per year and on
average use 0.5–1.0 per cent of their development
assistance on development evaluation (OECD
2010a). This implies that US$0.6–1.3 billion is
spent annually on development evaluation. To
this can be added evaluation budgets of new
donors, private foundations, etc. Their budgets
can, however, be assumed to be relatively small
compared to the OECD-DAC donors’ budgets for
evaluation. Most evaluation budgets are used for
different purposes related to evaluation (own
staff costs, preparation and dissemination of
evaluations, etc.) and not only for development
evaluation consultants. If it is assumed that other
donors than the OECD-DAC donors use 10 per
cent of what is used by the OECD-DAC donors,
and that approximately 50 per cent are used on
development consultants, the size of the market
for development evaluation consultants is about
US$300–600 million per year. This is obviously a
very rough estimate, and the assumptions can
clearly be questioned,7 but the main observation
is that the market has a significant size.
The consultants are usually contracted on
relatively standardised short-term contracts
based on TOR drafted by an evaluation unit,8
and the procedures will be similar to those used
in procurement of other goods and services. This
entails that the same procedures are used
whether the donor will fund a construction of a
road, a project evaluation or an evaluation of a
complex development intervention.
The demand for development evaluations has
increased significantly over the last decade and
probably to an extent that the supply of
development evaluation consultants has had
difficulties following this growth (see e.g. DFID
2014: 54, 57). The supply of development
evaluation consultants is relatively limited and
entry barriers are high in particular for team
leaders of development evaluations, i.e. due to
procurement procedures, where significant
consultant experience is often required. This
stability in the supply of evaluation development
consultants combined with a relatively low rotation
of staff members of evaluation units implies that
there will be continuous and repeated interaction
between them, and both evaluation consultants
and staff of evaluation units will probably consider
both the short term (the present contract) and
the long term (potential future collaboration),
when an evaluation is carried out (Andersen and
Broegaard 2012: 50). In addition, while some
evaluations may be conducted without much
contact between evaluation consultants and
evaluation units during the evaluation processes,
most evaluation processes today involve continuous
and close contact. It is reasonable to assume that
this contact is more pronounced for evaluations
of complex interventions, where the drafting of
TOR, including the design of the methodological
approach, will often be a challenge due to
insufficient information about the context,
interventions, local actors, and also about data
availability and feasibility of conducting fieldwork.
Therefore evaluations of complex interventions
will often require more discussion and consultation
on the interpretation of TOR, on methodological
issues and the practical organisation of the
fieldwork. Also the strengthened focus on the use
of evaluations has led to more contact and
consultation during the evaluation process not only
between consultants and evaluation units, but also
with other stakeholders. Thus, in particular two
issues characterise the market for development
evaluation and distinguish it from most
competitive markets: the repeated interaction
between evaluation consultants and evaluation
units, and their frequent contact during the
individual evaluation processes.
3 Perspectives on development evaluation
processes
As indicated, there may be different perspectives
on the organisation of development evaluation
processes. In the following a distinction will be
made between three perspectives, which can
potentially lead to different implications and
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recommendations for how to organise the
evaluation process. The perspectives will only
briefly be introduced.
3.1 The ‘independence perspective’
This is the dominating perspective in discussions
on the organisation of development evaluations.
The key argument for using external consultants
is that it ensures independent evaluations, which
is considered important for ensuring both the
quality of the evaluations and their credibility.
Discussions in connection with this perspective
have in particular focused on various
institutional mechanisms, which can ensure the
independence of the development evaluations.
The proposed mechanisms can for instance focus
on transparency in tender procedures and the
position and mandate of the evaluation unit (see
Picciotto 2013: 30–32). As the argument for
independence presupposes the professionalism of
evaluation consultants, a further element in the
discussions related to this perspective has been
the degree to which it can be argued that
development evaluation is a profession and that
professionalism is the key motivating factor for
evaluation consultants in evaluation processes
(Jacob and Boisvert 2010; Picciotto 2011).9
However, it has also been argued that the study of
evaluation independence has been neglected
(Picciotto 2013: 18), and it is notable that
international evaluation norms and standards have
their focus on basic principles of independence,
but do not consider how the evaluation
independence can be influenced by different
characteristics of the development evaluations and
of the evaluation processes (compare with e.g.
OECD 2010b). The independence of evaluations
could in particular be relevant to consider if
there is frequent contact and dialogue between
consultants and evaluation units throughout the
evaluation processes, if it is a small relatively
stable group of consultants where there is a
mutual dependency between them and evaluation
units due to their repeated interactions, or when
the evaluation is of complex interventions, where
it can be difficult to draft detailed and precise
TOR, and the interpretation of the TOR is as a
consequence established through negotiation
during the evaluation process.
Although the perspective recommends a market
approach there has been limited focus on the
cost of the evaluations, and it seems often at
least implicitly assumed – although apparently
never systematically analysed – that the market
provides an efficient solution to procurement of
evaluation consultants. As mentioned above the
general supply of consultants may, however, have
difficulties in meeting an increasing demand,
which can lead to increasing evaluation costs
(see DFID 2014: 53).
3.2 The ‘transaction cost perspective’
This perspective has been less discussed in
connection with development evaluation, but
would take its inspiration from transaction cost
economics.10 The argument would be that the
production of evaluations should be organised in
a way that minimises their transaction costs with
the implication that the organisation of evaluations
should reflect the specific characteristics of the
evaluations. In this perspective the market solution
and the internal solution are considered as
alternative modes of governance, and it thus
leaves room for different organisational solutions.
The transaction cost economics approach has
developed a number of principles – for example
asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty (see
Williamson 1998: 36) – which can be used to
consider and compare the relevance of different
organisational solutions. The arguments from
the transaction cost economics literature imply
that standard and relatively simple evaluations
(or evaluation tasks) could be out-sourced, while
more complex tasks of a recurrent nature should
be carried out in-house, and that the out-sourcing
of complex tasks could lead to high transaction
costs. These should obviously be compared to the
transaction costs associated with an internal
solution, but one description of the continuous
dialogue and endless discussions between
consultants and evaluation units during a complex
evaluation in South Sudan clearly demonstrates
the potentially high transaction costs, which can
be encountered during a development evaluation
(Barnett and Bennett 2014: 53–4).
While this perspective may provide some important
insights, it seems obvious that the production of
evaluations – i.e. due to the repeated interaction
between consultants and evaluation units, and
their contact during the evaluation processes
cannot just be compared to the production of
other goods and services. The characteristics of
external and internal organisational solutions
may therefore differ substantially from other
areas of production, and the delimitation and
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measurement of the transaction costs would
entail particular challenges. Moreover, the
incentives and motivations are complex and
could, for instance, differ among different groups
of stakeholders or be linked to different degrees
of professionalism among the development
evaluation consultants, and it is not convincing
that the rather simple behavioural assumptions
of the transaction cost economics approach
capture these various incentives, or that
transaction cost minimisation should guide how
evaluation processes are organised.
3.3 The ‘political economy perspective’
This perspective, which can be considered as an
extension of the transaction cost perspective,
provides a more nuanced framework for analysing
the interaction between evaluation consultants
and evaluation units during the evaluation
process.11 Like the transaction cost perspective
this perspective has attracted less attention in
discussions of evaluation processes. The perspective
will have its focus on the interactions between
the different actors, information problems and
asymmetric information, complex preference
structures and incentives, and on actors’ behaviour
and strategies in these complex settings and in view
of the often repeated character of the interactions.
The framework can also include other actors (the
general public, politicians, donor agencies, etc.)
and be used as a framework for analyses of
different types of influence, including power (see
e.g. Furubo and Vestman 2011). The perspective,
which seeks to move behind descriptive or
normative discussions, thus recognises that the
interactions between consultants and evaluation
units have a very complex nature, and that analyses
of the evaluation processes as a consequence will
have to be based on an understanding of these
interactions. As the number of analyses of the
evaluation processes is very limited, an implication
would be that recommendations about
organisational solutions can first be made after
more information has been collected and analysed.
The perspective would, however, probably lead to
similar conclusions as the transaction cost
perspective in which it was argued that
organisational solutions should reflect the
characteristics of the evaluation, but with the
difference that these ‘characteristics’ in this third
perspective will comprise a larger number of
different elements – and not only transaction costs.
Both the transaction cost and the political economy
perspective would therefore argue that the contract
procedures and the evaluation process will
influence the incentives of the various actors,
including the evaluation consultants, and therefore
must be designed taking this into consideration.
This contrasts with the present practice, where
most donor evaluation units tend to use the same
evaluation process for all evaluations without
contemplating the wide variation in the
characteristics of the evaluations, including the
increasing complexity of many evaluations.
4 Need for empirical analyses and experimentation
Although evaluation processes is often the
preferred discussion topic, when evaluation
consultants and staff from donor evaluation units
meet, there is insufficient systematic empirical
knowledge about these processes and the strategies
different actors apply.12 Instead, perceptions of the
evaluation processes seem to be based on rather
simple – and untested – assumptions about the
behaviour of evaluation consultants and evaluation
units, and without consideration for the changing
landscape of development evaluation and the
associated challenges. Due to the complexity of
many evaluation processes, further analytical work
should therefore be supplemented by collection
of available experiences and monitored
experimentation with potential organisational
solutions. Methodologically, monitoring and
learning from such experiences will be a challenge
due to the significant variation in contexts,
actors and evaluations, as well as the vested
interests of the various actors, and will require
careful planning. In the following, three, not
mutually exclusive, areas for further analyses
and experimentation will be briefly presented.
4.1 Empirical analyses of the behaviour of consultants
and evaluation units
While all who have been involved in development
evaluations can give many examples of highly
professional consultants with high ethical
standards in their work, the question is how in
practice this professionalism is balanced against
considerations for, for example, company profits
and future contracts. Both evaluation consultants
and evaluation units may therefore be guided by
a complex set of interests and strategies, and
they may prioritise these interests and strategies
differently in the individual evaluations.
As mentioned above these discussions have been
seen as closely related to discussions of
independence. If professionalism is the dominant
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motivating factor for development evaluation
consultants, this could lead to a demand for
independence and flexibility in the evaluation
process; and a market solution could be the
preferred organisational solution. On the other
hand, if professionalism is not dominating or if
staff of evaluation units possess a similar
professional approach, the argument that
external solutions are required to ensure
independence would be less convincing. A
particular issue is which factors influence the
strategies of the evaluation consultants, and
whether their affiliation (consultancy company,
freelance, research institution, university, etc.)
plays a significant role.
In addition to empirical analyses of the behaviour
of evaluation consultants, analyses of the
behaviour of evaluation units on the evaluation
market and in the evaluation process would be
warranted. Evaluation units are often either
presented as neutral evaluation commissioners or
it is argued that internal evaluation units are not
autonomous in spite of various safeguards. These
descriptions are obviously very general and do not
in any detail reflect the behaviour of evaluation
units and their staff or the complexity of the
evaluation processes (see Andersen and
Broegaard 2012). For instance, reasonable
assumptions will be that the institutional set-up
of the units will influence the behaviour of the
staff, and that staff of evaluation units will also be
guided by some degree of professionalism. A
particular issue in the evaluation process is the
strategies evaluation units apply if the work of
the evaluation consultants is not found to meet
the expected quality (see e.g. ITAD 2014: 73).
The above raises a number of questions on the
behaviour of not only evaluation consultants, but
also evaluation units and their staff, which can
only be answered empirically. There is therefore
a need for further empirical work on incentives
and strategies of the different actors in different
contexts, including in connection with different
types of evaluations, and as indicated the
political economy perspective will provide an
adequate analytical framework for such analyses.
4.2 Experimentation with evaluation models
Basically four models are used in organising
development evaluations: the whole evaluation is
out-sourced; the evaluation is split up into several
individual external contracts; consultants are
contracted to support an internal team leader; the
evaluation is carried out by the evaluation unit.
Due to the complexity of the interactions
between consultants and evaluation units during
the evaluation processes and the lack of
systematic knowledge about these processes,
currently it is not possible analytically to define
criteria, which can be applied in decisions on the
organisation of the individual evaluations. As
mentioned, ‘independence’ seems often to be a
key argument in discussions on the organisation
of evaluations, but the usual interpretation of
‘independence’ is very much linked to evaluation
processes of more traditional interventions, for
instance project assistance, without trying to
understand how the characteristics of the
evaluations can impact on the evaluation process
and on both the actual and perceived
independence of the evaluations. In addition, it
may be argued that independence will not be
considered equally important for all evaluations.
Therefore experience with different models
should be collected more systematically. Already
today there is a lot of variation, but monitoring is
scarce, and the variation, to the extent it exists,
can be found between donor agencies and rarely
within agencies due to the fact that the individual
agencies tend to use the same procedures for all
their evaluations. Experiments within individual
agencies with different organisational solutions
for different types of evaluations and subsequent
monitoring of these experiments would therefore
be useful in order to develop practical criteria to
be applied in decisions on organisational models.
Basic questions to explore are how different
organisational solutions for the individual
development evaluations influence, for example,
the quality, credibility and use of the evaluations.
A particular consideration will be whether there
is a greater need for learning from some
evaluations than others, and whether this should
influence the choice of organisational model. For
instance, a challenge is to conduct and learn from
evaluations of complex interventions, which may
require specific adapted organisational solutions.13
If evaluation processes should be adjusted to the
characteristics of the individual evaluations several
additional questions of a more institutional nature
will have to be considered. First, who should decide
on the organisation solution for the individual
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evaluation and will it be possible to develop some
common norms and standards to guide this
decision? Second, will donors be prepared to
establish sufficient budget and institutional
flexibility? For instance, the flexibility should
comprise flexibility between budgets for
consultants and budgets for in-house evaluation
staff. Third, will a specific system for quality
control that can ensure that common quality
standards are applied for all evaluations – whatever
organisational model used – have to be created?
Today most development evaluations go through
quality control before completion, but greater
flexibility in the selection of organisational
model may lead to calls for establishment of
separate quality control mechanisms. Fourth, to
which degree should the specific characteristics
(for example, size of staff, budget and staff
qualifications) of the individual evaluation units
influence the selection of evaluation model?
4.3 Experimentation with selection of consultants and
TOR
There are different models, which can be used in
engaging consultants in evaluations, but most
consultants are selected based on TOR and (a
few) references. Although interviews are
conducted it varies how much influence these
interviews have on the final selection of the
consultants. The basic requested qualifications of
the evaluation consultants seem also to be quite
similar from one evaluation to the next with a
strong focus on the references from previous
evaluations. In addition, a study found that many
TORs do not detail the required competencies of
the evaluation consultants (ITAD 2014). Thus,
the selection process is basically the same
whether it is a rather simple standard evaluation
or a more complex evaluation.
The TORs for development evaluations have also
been criticised for having too many questions
and an insufficient description of the requested
methodological approach. Some argue for the
importance of having detailed and relatively
specific TOR, even for complex evaluations (see
Grävingholt and Leininger 2014: 168). However,
desperate attempts to write very detailed TOR
may not solve the problem as they may not
reflect what is feasible in a specific evaluation,
for example due to insufficient information at
the time of drafting the TOR. Evaluations with
many questions may instead lead to evaluations
with a lack of depth (ITAD 2014: 72) and very
general conclusions and recommendations
(Andersen and Broegaard 2012). A potential
implication can also be that not all questions in
the TOR can be answered adequately. This is
probably the reason for proposals of more open-
ended and flexible TOR (Barnett and Bennett
2014: 55–6).
Another dimension will be the length of the
assignment, where a complex evaluation may
require a much longer time span in order to
conduct an evaluation of reasonable quality.
An evaluation in Afghanistan showed the value of
having given the evaluation consultants large
flexibility and a longer time period to develop the
methodology and complete the evaluation
(Böhnke, Koehler and Zürcher 2014). A long-term
contract is obviously close to an internal solution
and may be met with the same questions related
to quality control and independence, but can
reduce the potential problem of insufficient
internal evaluation capacity. In particular smaller
evaluation units may not always be able to identify
in-house evaluators with sufficient expertise
within the areas to be evaluated. That there is an
evaluation capacity problem has been noted in
several analyses of donor agencies (see e.g. DFID
2014; ITAD 2014), and substantial training
programmes have therefore been recommended.
As in the case of the two previous areas there is
limited empirical knowledge about the
significance of the selection procedures, the
TORs, and of the contracts for different types of
evaluations. Present information is based on a
few analyses and a lot of anecdotal evidence, and
apparently, in spite of quite a lot of normative
work, there is no general agreement about how
to deal with these elements in the evaluation
process. Therefore, also in this area more
empirical analyses are required.
5 Concluding remarks
As mentioned in the introduction, the
discussions on development evaluation have in
particular focused on methodological issues and
on institutional solutions, which can ensure the
independence of evaluations, while the
evaluation processes have attracted less
attention. The purpose of this article is to argue
that the evaluation process plays a greater role
than usually envisaged for the outcomes of
development evaluations.
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In connection with the evaluation processes in
particular four issues were identified. First,
evaluation processes have generally not been
revised to reflect the changing nature of
development evaluation and upcoming new
challenges, including a number of evaluations of
complex interventions. Second, evaluation units
tend to use the same ‘system’ for organising all
their development evaluations in spite of
significant variations in the characteristics of the
evaluations, and other perspectives on the
evaluation process than the ‘independence
perspective’ have attracted less interest. Third,
the evaluation process comprises a number of
individual elements, which can be combined in
different ways. These elements include, for
example, consultant selection criteria, TOR, types
of contracts, different kinds of quality control,
etc. Fourth, only few empirical analyses of the
evaluation processes are available with the
implication that systematic empirical knowledge
about the evaluation process and its elements is
limited. These four issues together raise the
important question as to whether – due to a concern
for evaluation independence – evaluation processes
are organised in a way which may not lead to
development evaluations of the desired quality.
In order to establish a better basis for taking
decisions on the organisation of evaluations, it
was suggested, using the political economy
perspective as an analytical framework, to
conduct empirical analyses of the incentives and
strategies of evaluation consultants and
evaluation units in connection with different
kinds of evaluations. Further, it was proposed to
monitor experiments with different evaluation
models and their elements, such as consultant
requirements, TOR, contract types and quality
control, and to assess the implication on
evaluation quality, credibility and use.
The evaluation process is just one contributing
factor to the final outcome of an evaluation, but
as the way the evaluation process is designed has
implications for the incentives of the various actors,
the evaluation process should reflect the purpose
and characteristics of the individual evaluations.
Many consultants and evaluation units are aware
of this, but practical reasons and formal
restrictions may prevent them from adjusting
the way evaluation processes are managed.
The indicated empirical analyses and
experiments may be met with some resistance
due to vested interests and will be difficult to
conduct methodologically, but may also provide
important new insights in the development
evaluation processes and facilitate future
improvements in development evaluation quality.
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a number of excellent comments to a previous
draft of this article. The views expressed in
the article are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. 
1 See for example White (2009) and Stern et al.
(2012) for different perspectives on this
discussion and with a particular focus on
impact evaluations.
2 See for example Ling (2012) and Picciotto
(2012) for introductions to recent discussions,
including to the distinction between simple,
complicated and complex interventions.
3 Many stakeholders, including staff from donor
evaluation units, seem to agree – at least
informally – that there is a problem with the
quality of many development evaluations (see
for example Picciotto 2011: 171 and 2012: 220,
which explicitly mention the low quality of many
development evaluations. See also ITAD 2014).
4 See for example Eliadis, Furubo and Jacob
(2011: 55), which mentions that the
‘methodological and scientific dimensions…
overshadow the power dimension and does not
allow for a full grasp of the issues, which drive
the evaluation process’ and Picciotto (2013:
18), which mentions that ‘the governance
dimension of evaluation is rarely addressed’. 
5 In this article ‘consultant’ and ‘evaluation
consultant’ comprise those who are contracted
to conduct development evaluations, including
consultancy companies, freelance consultants,
research institutes, universities, etc.
6 www.oecd.org (accessed 26 June 2014). 
7 It should be noted that this estimate is only for
development evaluations. Development reviews,
appraisals, etc. are also conducted by development
consultants, and it can be assumed that the
budgets for these tasks are much higher. 
8 Due to lack of data it is not possible to provide
information on the specific composition of
different types of contracts (short-term, long-
term, framework contracts, etc.). 
6 WincklerAndersen IDSB45.6.qxd  16/10/2014  13:05  Page 83
9 Note that Picciotto (2011) makes a distinction
between models based on a competitive
market and professionalism. This distinction
will not be made in this article. 
10 For introductions to transaction cost
economics, see the work of Oliver Williamson
(e.g. Williamson 1998). There are only a few
attempts to operationalise the transaction
cost perspective in connection with
development evaluation (see e.g. Jobin 2008
and Andersen and Broegaard 2012). 
11 See for example Andersen and Broegaard
(2012), where further references can be found.  
12 Apparently, there is an increasing interest for
conducting analyses within this area, but
usually without distinguishing between
different kinds of development evaluations
(see e.g. DFID 2014; ITAD 2014).
13 Embedded evaluations have been seen as a
solution to this learning objective, but as shown
in a recent review, embedding evaluations may
lead to particular challenges (DFID 2014). 
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